Coalition-formation is an important tool to leverage countries' bargaining power in the GATT/WTO negotiations. Unlike the "weapons of the weak" reasoning, several econometric models and specifications show that larger economies have a higher probability of joining coalitions. Challenging the view that middle powers have a distinguishable collectivist behavior, even non-linear models show that the relationship between real GDP and coalition entry has an almost linear shape. Large economies join coalitions more because they are more equipped to pay transaction costs and more prepared to deal with the risks of uncertain negotiations. Countries more open to trade also join coalitions often-a less surprising result since the GATT/WTO is a pro-open trade international institution. At last, unlike the "democratic peace" literature, we do not find that democracies cooperate more than dictatorships. When dictatorships become more democratic, they tend to join coalitions more up to a threshold; after that, the effect decreases forming an inverted Ushaped curve, suggesting that the correlation between political regime and cooperation is not straightforward.
I. Introduction
Few studies have explored the role of international bargaining coalitions (Hamilton and Whalley, 1989; Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Narlikar and Tussie, 2004; Costantini et al., 2007; Narlikar, 2003) and even fewer have done that quantitatively (Costantini et al., 2007) . In this paper, we propose a still unanswered basic question: "which are the most important economic and political factors that increase the probability of countries join coalitions?"
The question is important because some authors take for granted that coalitions are one of the few tools that weak countries have at their disposal (Drahos, 2003; Braithwaite, 2004) .
As Narlikar points out eloquently: "United we stand, divided we fall. The reasoning of the weak in their dealings with the strong is simple and direct" (Narlikar, 2003, p. 1) .
Some practitioners and scholars believe that developing countries have a voice against the power of the developed countries at the GATT/WTO; then, it is better to negotiate multilaterally than bilaterally. 1 In particular, GATT/WTO coalitions are considered an effective tool at the disposal of developing countries. Whether a useful tool or not, we found that powerful countries take advantage of this tool more often. We explain our finding by arguing that collectively negotiating at the GATT/WTO is costly. Among other costs, countries have to train and keep diplomatic missions in Geneva. We tested the proposed causal mechanism and found evidences that the number of delegates in Geneva is an mediator variable between real GDP and coalition entry.
Our paper employs an unique country-level panel data set. It contains 3,189 observations of 144 countries bargaining at the GATT/WTO from 1982 to 2008. Our main result contradicts the view that coalitions are "weapons of the weak" (Drahos, 2003; Braithwaite, 2004) . The effect of GDP is large-an increase of one standard deviation increases the likelihood of a country joining a coalition by 60%. When we used 7 years lag of natural disaster as an instrumental variable for real GDP, the results get even larger-around 145%. We also test the argument that coalitions at the GATT/WTO are weapons used more often by middle powers. The main assumption of the middle power literature is that weak countries are irrelevant at international negotiations because they have scarce resources, whereas powerful countries are capable of acting unilaterally and do not want to bind themselves with coalitions commitments. Middle powers are, then, prone to have a collectivist behavior (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Higgott and Cooper, 1990) . To test the middle power hypothesis, we examine the functional form of the relationship between GDP and coalition entry. Theoretically, the middle power hypothesis has a quadratic functional form, whereas the weapons of the weak notion has a decreasing linear function.
We employ Generalized Additive Models (GAM) to graphically display the non-linear relationship between our dependent and independent variables. The positive relationship between real GDP and coalition entry is quasi-linear, even using non-linear models. 2 Other findings concern the relationship between coalition entry and both trade openness and political regimes. Countries more open to trade are also more likely to join coalitions. Not strikingly, considering that the GATT/WTO is a pro-open trade institution. Finally, contrary to the "democratic peace" literature (Olson, 1965; Chamberlin, 1974; Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; Esteban, 2001 ), democracies do not cooperate more by means of coalition building at the GATT/WTO negotiations. As it should be clear, GATT/WTO members are already cooperating by joining the international trade system.
Another contribution of our study is the measurement of our dependent variablecoalition entry. Most studies have only analyzed few cases of bargaining coalitions at the GATT/WTO (Narlikar, 2003; Hamilton and Whalley, 1989; Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Narlikar and Tussie, 2004; Odell, 2009) . As far as we know, a measure of coalition entry that enables quantitative analyzes has not been used before this research. Our main source of information is the WTO website. 3 The section "Groups in the Negotiations" have information on groups participating in the WTO negotiations, such as: coalition names; country member names; the issues they are negotiating; coalitions' websites; and the nature of coalitions (e.g. custom union, regional, or broad interests). We have supplemented the WTO data by reading the specialized literature. 4 The main information required to build our dependent variable is coalition names, their members, and the year of coalition formation-see Table 1 . Coalitions' first year is our main benchmark to acknowledge the number and names of countries that join a coalition. We choose the year of the coalition formation as benchmark because it is easier to observe which are the members of the coalition at its onset. Many coalitions are informal groups, but members present a position paper signing their names before the negotiations or even maintain a website. They rarely, however, go public stating they are leaving a coalition. The unit of analysis of our data set is at the country-level. We observed how many times a country i has entered in trade coalitions at year t . As important as it is, we cannot distinguish between long-and short-lived coalitions with our data; countries only join once each coalition.
In the next section, we review the history of the GATT/WTO, focusing on the increasing role of bargaining coalitions. In the third section, we discuss our theoretical argument proposing an explanation for our results. In the fourth section, we describe our data and variables. In the fifth section, we discuss our methodology and our main results. Finally, we conclude our paper.
II. Overall Context
In recent years, bargaining coalitions at the WTO has become increasingly visible.
While there had been few coalitions in GATT's early years, the number of coalitions increased substantially since the 1980s (Narlikar, 2003, p. 34) . GATT was a "Rich Man's Club," where tariff protection and US domination in terms of international trade were the rule. At the formation of the GATT, 11 of the 23 founding members were developing countries. Despite their relatively large proportion, developing countries maintained a low profile in the GATT (Narlikar, 2003, p. 35) . According to Rubens Ricupero-former Brazilian ambassador in Geneva (1987 Geneva ( -1991 and president of the "Informal Group of Developing Countries" in the GATT (1989 GATT ( -1991 :
The present trade regime originated in an Anglo-American conception and was part of a major restructuring of the international order after the Second World War, together with the institutions created at Bretton Woods-the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank-and, in its political dimension, the United Nations. This structure, particularly its socio-economic aspect, was able to be built only because there was a hegemonic economic power-the United States of America, which was determined to be the foundation of the institutional expression of beliefs regarding free trade that were deep-seated in the inherited values of the ruling Anglophile and internationalist elite of that country's East coast (Ricupero, 1998) .
Few years before the beginning of Uruguay Round, we can see many changes in the world trade negotiations. During an US temporary relative decline in 1980s, the Reagan administration (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) changed its trade policies regarding US traditional trade partners (Evans, 1989) . Domestic protectionism was condemned based on the idea of unfair trade. US trade partners were pushed to liberalize their trade. At the same time, the US started to advocate deep reforms in the international trade system. The Uruguay Round (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) was, in large part, pushed forward by the US international pressures (Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990; Bhagwati, 1990 ) and the WTO is the most important result of the trade talks.
International trade changes rarely happen without affected countries defending themselves. Many times, they form coalitions. For this reason, coalitions increasingly became active and visible in the Uruguay Round. During the negotiations, most coalitions were nicknamed bloc-type coalitions because they wanted to blockade many proposals pushed forward by the US and other developed nations (Narlikar, 2003) . One of the most visible developing country coalitions was the G-10, in which Brazil and India played a prominent role. The G-10 was composed of countries with diverse interests that made impossible to this group keeps its unity until the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations (Abreu, 1994) .
The pre-launch phase of the Uruguay Round also saw the formation of other coalitions of developing countries, such as Café au Lait and the G-20 (Narlikar, 2003, p. 39) . Developed nations formed their own coalition-called Quad (Canada, European Community, Japan, and the United States)-to push their liberalization agenda in the Uruguay Round, while being reluctant to push the opening of agricultural markets in the developed world. During the Uruguay Round, the European Community (EC) also acted as if it was a coalition, especially concerning agricultural negotiations and opposing the Cairns Group-formed by competitive agricultural exporting countries.
Some authors believe that coalitions are "weapons of the weak" because they think developing countries can counter-balance the power of rich nations only if they increase their bargaining power through coalitions (Drahos, 2003; Braithwaite, 2004) . During the Uruguay Round developing countries that were leading coalitions-for example, Brazil and India when they formed the G-10-were not weak countries since they already had a comparatively large real GDP. Even back them, countries such as Brazil and India were widely viewed as leaders of the developing world and important trade nations (Preeg, 1995; Hurrell, 2006; Burges, 2013) .
Nowadays Brazil and India are called emerging powers or would-be great powers (Schirm, 2010; Hurrell, 2006) . During the Uruguay Round, they were weaker in comparison with great powers of Europe and the United States than now. But still stronger than most countries in the world. They were, however, unable to block advances in areas such as services, investments and property rights-that resulted in major agreements within the WTO system. They were not able to include the issue of agriculture subsidies in the Uruguay Round as well. The Cairns Group put the defense of agricultural liberalization on the Uruguay Round agenda, with an intermediate position between the proposals of the United States and the European Community (EC) (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Higgott and Cooper, 1990) . After many years of negotiations, however, the US and the European Community agreed in postpone the liberalization of agricultural products and the Cairns Group has reduced its own bargaining power. The agreement was celebrate in November 1992 and is known as Blair House Agreement (Meunier, 2000; Veiga, 2005) .
After the failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, there was an increased demand to change the WTO. Public riots and demonstrations outside the deliberations raised concerns about the internal legitimacy of the WTO. Representatives from the developing world complained about the marginalization from key decision-making processes (Schott, 2000; Levi and Murphy, 2006) . With a similar rationale to that of the Uruguay Round, developing countries recognized that they could achieve more by joining economic forces through coalitions (Narlikar, Daunton and Stern, 2012, p. 172) .
During the Doha Round, developing country coalitions were successful in proposing and defending their narrow or issue-based agenda (Narlikar, 2003) . Starting with the Doha Declaration in 2001, they were successful in stating that intellectual pharmaceutical property rights were not more important than the lives of individuals around the world, especially the ones living with HIV/Aids and other infectious diseases in developing countries (Sell and Prakash, 2004; Odell, 2009) . Again, developing countries that were advocating this agenda were not the weakest economic countries in the world. They were at minimum regional powers. Brazil, India and South Africa were singled out as the main leaders and winners of the Doha Declaration (Sell and Prakash, 2004; Odell, 2009) .
During the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003, the G-20 maintained a unified position around three sets of demands: 1) greater market access in the North; 2) reduction of developed countries exports subsidies and domestic support mechanism; and 3) a defensive position to protect agricultural markets of developing countries (Narlikar, Daunton and Stern, 2012, p. 175) . The G-20 was also successful in obtaining the support of other smaller coalitions, such as the G-4, the Five Interested Parties, the G-6, and the G-7. Once more, the leaders of the G-20 were strong developing nations, such as Brazil, India and China (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004) .
There are many other coalitions working in the WTO. As we can see in Figure 1 , all countries that were at the WTO until 2008 joined at least once a coalition. Many coalitions are less prominent than the ones we mentioned here (see Table 1 ). Countries that join coalitions more are neither weak nor middle powers. Coalitions are, then, another tool mainly in the hands of powerful countries.
III. Cooperation at the GATT/WTO system
Starting with Olson (1965) , collective action literature argues that there is a tendency for systematic exploitation of the great by the small for the payment of collective benefits. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) illustrates the Olson's theory of collective action with examples of the NATO and the United Nations. According to them, the United States bore an excessive cost to promote the collective security of the NATO states. Moreover, smaller NATO members dedicated small percentages of their budgets for this common goal. Similarly, they argue that the UN urges major economies to bear a disproportionate portion of the costs of maintaining the institution when compared to least developed countries.
The debate on whether larger groups can be successful working together and promoting their interests is the trademark of collective action studies for at least four decades (Olson, 1965; Chamberlin, 1974; Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; Esteban, 2001) . Only implicitly, the mainstream of the collective action literature suggests that smaller members join groups or coalitions more often because they benefit from public goods paying a small part of the production costs. In this regard, our findings contribute to the collective action debate by empirically showing that at the international trade system stronger countries have incentives to join coalitions.
Within a different framework, Keohane (1969, p. 295) proposes a typology based on the role that each type of country has on the international system, dividing all countries into four categories. The first type is the "imperial power" in a unipolar system or the two major powers in a bipolar system. They are large states that have a central role in shaping the international system by themselves. Second, there are states that do not dominate the system individually, but are able to significantly influence it through unilateral 6 or multilateral action. Third, middle powers are not able to affect the system in isolation, but may be relevant when they act collectively. At last, there are small states that cannot influence the international system, except when in large groups. Independently, each small state has a minimal influence within the system. After Keohane's typology, a literature has emerged suggesting that middle powers have a more collectivist behavior than other groups of countries. It is assumed that middle powers exert a relevant influence in the international arena only through collective action (Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993) . Consequently, middle powers would join coalitions and international institutions more often than either weak and powerful countries. While weak countries are largely irrelevant, powerful countries are capable of acting unilaterally without having to make concessions to other coalition members.
Finally, many studies predict that democratic regimes are more likely to engage in free trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2000; Dai, 2002; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008) . A common argument is that democratic countries seek to protect wealth gained through international trade because they can specialize in goods they have a comparative advantage, whereas they import from countries that have a comparative advantage they do not have (Polachek, 1997; Edward, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002a; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . To increase the probability of remaining in office, democratic leaders also use international cooperation to signal to voters their willingness to implement pro-trade welfare-enhancing policies (Edward, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002b; Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2008; Mansfield and Milner, 2010) .
At last, democracies are also more able to establish credible commitments, which makes international cooperation more likely (Leeds, 1999; McGillivray and Smith, 2008; Martin, 2000) .
As for the main question of this paper, we find that economically stronger countries join trade coalitions more often than weak ones. We interpret our main finding importing explanations from economic literature on "transaction costs" (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1979; North, 1990) . Together with the transaction costs, we also take into consideration the debate about uncertain and asymmetrical gains from participating in GATT/WTO system (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007) . Moreover, normative changes and law-making can also be considered gains from participating in the GATT/WTO (Finnemore and Toope, 2001; Goldstein et al., 2000) . The literatures on credible commitments (Leeds, 1999; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993) and compliance (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996; Simmons, 1998) are also full of examples about the difficulties to enforce agreements between countries. Costs are even higher when agreements are informal-as is the case of GATT/WTO bargaining coalitions (Leeds, 1999; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996; Simmons, 1998) .
Transaction costs can be divided into three categories: 1) search and information costs, 2) bargaining and decision costs, and 3) policing and enforcement costs. Search and information costs are costs to locate the other party one wants to deal with and obtain the information necessary to negotiate. Bargaining costs are the costs to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party about the division of surplus, drawing up an appropriate contract. Policing and enforcement costs are the costs of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract. If it is necessary, one party can take a legal action to enforce the contract (Coase, 1960; Dahlman, 1979) . Dahlman (1979, p. 148) argues that all three costs can be reduced to a single one-"resources lost due to lack of information." Similar to other studies, we extend "transaction cost" arguments to international relations (Keohane, 1989; Gilligan, 2010; Baccini, 2012) .
Larger economies join coalitions more because they are better equipped to pay the "transaction costs" involved in bargaining together in the GATT/WTO. The "transaction is also a source of "transactional costs" (Olson, 1965; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) as more countries with different trade preferences need to be satisfied with the final agreement.
The GATT/WTO system has increased the number of countries involved in negotiations.
Different countries have different interests and, as a result, negotiations have become more and more complex at each round (Barton et al., 2008; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2010) . 5 The time span of the trade rounds have increased proportionally. 6 5 The single undertaking is a foundational rule of the GATT/WTO system. Virtually every item of the negotiation table is part of a whole and indivisible agreement and cannot be realized separately. As cited at the WTO website: "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
6 The first trade round in Geneva in 1947 took 7 months with 23 countries discussing only tariffs' reduction. The Annecy round in 1949 took 5 months to finish, where 13 countries had also discussed tariffs. The third round (Torquay -1950) took 8 months and 38 countries debated the same topic. At the fourth trade round in 1956 (again in Geneva), it was needed 5 months to complete an agreement; and 26 countries discussed Our causal mechanism is, then, summarized as the following. Large economies benefit more from the international trade system and can pay the cost to make sure they continue to benefit from it either by obtaining material gains or by shaping international rules and practices. Collectively negotiating is not only costly, but also risky. At the onset, nobody knows the results of trade rounds and the unintended consequences of trade agreements.
IV. Data and Variables
Coalition-formation is a tool to leverage countries' bargaining power in the GATT/WTO negotiations. Countries join a coalition when they share a common identity or interest. Our dependent variable-coalition entry-was collected from the "Groups in the Negotiations" section of the WTO website and through the reading of qualitative case studies (see Introduction). It measures the number of times each country joined a trade coalition each year.
We have data on coalitions from 1982 to 2008. We observed our last coalition in 2008, when the Doha Round was in the middle of a deadlock because of disagreements between some of its main players on agricultural issues-i.e., the United States, the European Union, India and Brazil. Consequently, few coalitions have been active until the time of the writing of this article. We started collecting data in 2008 and we finish it in 2013.
Historical evidences suggest that coalition formation has become more common since 1980s thanks to a series of changes that were taking place on the international scene at the time: 1) the rise of liberalism of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, 2) the decline of American hegemony, 3) the confrontation with newly industrialized countries with protectionist practices, and 4) the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. In a nutshell, what seemed a relative decline of the US and a change of economic ideology in powerful countries made the US adopt a more aggressive position towards some of its trade partners in the developing world (such as, Brazil and India) (Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990; Bhagwati, 1990) . As a result, large developing countries started to form more and more coalitions to tariffs and the admission of Japan. Finally, at 1960, 26 countries discussed tariffs in the Dillon round. The Kennedy round in Geneva increased substantially the number of country participants (62) and the time to complete the round (37 months) on tariffs and anti-dumping rules. The same happened with the Tokyo round, where 102 countries took 74 months to reach an agreement on tariffs, non-tariff measures, and "framework" agreements. During the time of our study (from 1982 to 2008) , the trade rounds have become extremely long and complex. Transaction costs have been costly for many countries. The Uruguay Round, which started at 1986, involved 123 countries that negotiated many trade topics during 87 months and fundamentally changed the whole international trade system by creating the WTO in 1994. Finally, the Doha round started in 2001 with 159 countries with many more topics on the table, as for example the struggle for the liberalization of services and agriculture markets. The Doha talks have only come to an agreement after 12 years of negotiations. defend themselves. All these episodes were important to push forward trade negotiations that led to the Uruguay Round (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (Gilpin and Gilpin, 1987; Barton et al., 2008) We withdrew from our data set countries that have not participated in the GATT/WTO system during the time of our study . Countries have become part of our data set starting at the moment they entered the GATT/WTO system. Coalition activities are difficult to observe. It is hard to know for sure if a member either stayed or left a coalition during the negotiations. Historical records are vague. Many times the only moment when a coalition let the name of its members clear is when it proposes its first negotiation draft. To supplement the information on the WTO website, the number of coalition members is measured at the year of the coalition formation based on the reading of the qualitative literature and of official documents from the GATT/WTO. Unfortunately we cannot distinguish between short-and long-lived coalitions with our data.
To mitigate problems related to measurement error in our dependent variable, we measure coalition entry in two different ways: i) all coalitions that have participated at the GATT/WTO (coaltrade) and ii) coalitions that have just been created for the GATT/WTO negotiations (coalwto). For "coalwto", we exclude coalitions that negotiate both inside and outside the GATT/WTO system; for example, African, Caribbean and Pacific group, Apec and Caricom, and also regional trade alliances as European Union, Mercosur and Naftasee Table 1 . Regional integration coalitions were classified as Non-WTO coalitions. Our analysis with two different dependent variables (coaltrade and coalwto) are not substantively or significantly different. The results were slightly weaker in the second measurement (coalwto) since we increased the number of zeros in our dependent variable. 7
A. Independent Variables
We collected all our independent variables from official databases. The description of the variables is presented in Table 2 . We have two economic variables. Real GDP is our main explanatory variable. Contrary to the view that suggests that coalitions are weapons of the weak or of middle powers, we found that the higher the real GDP, the higher is the probability of countries joining a coalition. We collected data on GDP from Penn World Table ( PWT 6.3.) Our other economic variable-trade openness (openk)-was also collected from PWT 6.3 and is measured by the sum of import and export flows divided by GDP of each country annually. Higher levels of trade openness is also an important predictor of a country joining a coalition. The result on trade openness is less counter-intuitive because the GATT/WTO system is ruled by a free-trade principle. 8
Because of the debate whether democracy should be a continuous or categorical measure (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Przeworski et al., 2000; Elkins, 2000; Collier and Adcock, 1999), we use two measures of democracy. The first is a dichotomous indicatordemocracy versus dictatorship -created by Alvarez et al. (1996) and updated by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) . The second is a continuous index of democracy-Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) . The Polity IV democracy score varies from -10 (complete dictatorship) to +10 (full democracy). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our main variables divided by the North-South hemispheres and also for the whole world.
To deal with the long-standing literature on the North and South divide (Raffer and Singer, 2001 ), we include a proxy to capture North-South division as a control in our study. We cannot include the North-South variable in our panel analysis because fixed- Normally the geographic division is a metaphor for economic and political divisions. For instance, few authors disagree that New Zealand and Australia are part of the economic and political bloc of Northern countries; whereas China and India are viewed as Southern countries. According to the North-South divide literature, usually geographic and politicaleconomic characteristics overlap. Albeit we are sure that the geographic measure is not completely fair to such an ample literature, other problems would emerge if we create our 8 We also tested if real GDP per capita, size of the government, growth rate of real GDP per capita, battle-related deaths, electric power consumption (kWh per capita), exports (% of GDP), imports (% of GDP) and total trade (% of GDP) have an effect on the coalition entry. They do not have either a significant or relevant effect. Conducted at early stages of the research, extreme bounds analysis (Leamer, 1985) (a sensitivity analysis technique) and Bayesian additive regression trees (BART) (Chipman, George and McCulloch, 2010 ) (a machine learning technique) also selected the variables used in this paper as the most relevant.
9 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ own measure, since countries move up or down in a scale of power and development (e.g.
Asian Tigers and BRIC nations). As sometimes world changes are not clear-cut, we choose to use a geographic and more straightforward and time-invariant measure of Northern and Southern countries.
Finally, the size of members' delegation in Geneva is used as a proxy for the "transaction costs" that countries incur when negotiating at the GATT/WTO. Delegates in Geneva is a mediator variable between real GDP and coalition entry. The WTO used to publish an annual phone directory for internal use which lists each member's delegates in Geneva (Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009, p. 562) . Unfortunately there was only data available from 1994−2004-a shorter time-horizon than the one of used in the remaining of our paper (1982 − 2008) . The data used here were collected by Sattler and Bernauer (2011) .
V. Methodology
We employ both panel data econometrics and cross-section (pooled) non-linear models in this study. In panel form, we present results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS),
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and both Logistic and Negative Binomial regressions.
To explore our proposed causal mechanism, we present a mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2011 ) using multilevel models, where the intercept of our regressions vary yearly (Gelman, 2007) . In cross-sectional form, we present graphical results from the non-linear Generalized Additive Models (GAMs). In this section, we outline some basic features of our models.
A. Panel Data Econometrics
Panel data techniques offer a series of advantages over cross-section analyzes. For example, increasing the estimation accuracy and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Hsiao, 2003; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . In this paper, we run OLS, 2SLS, Logistic and Negative Binomial panel models.
Fixed-effects models include different intercepts for each individual countries. Unobserved heterogeneity α is no longer a random variable but a parameter to be estimated.
Fixed-effects models allow for unbiased estimation even in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity α correlated with the regressors (Wooldridge, 2010 (Wooldridge, , 2012 Some econometricians defend the use of OLS models even when we have limited de-pendent variables (e.g., Logit) or count dependent variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012) . Our preferred panel model is a simple OLS fixed-effects model. 11 The advantages of OLS models are that they are normally consistent and easier to interpret than Logit and Negative Binomial models. Below we describe the OLS model:
where t = 1,..., T and i = 1,..., N . α i is the unobserved time-invariant individual country effect (country-specific intercept); Y it is the dependent variable "coalition entry" observed for individual country i at time t ; βX it is the time-variant regressor of the log of real GDP;
γZ it is a vector of other covariates for individual country i at time t ; and ε it is the error term for individual country i at time t .
The Logistic Panel Model is employed when the dependent variable is defined as whether or not countries enter a coalition each specific year. The relationships between the explanatory variables and the probability of entering in coalitions are estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. Finally, count panel data econometrics is an obvious statistical tool to tackle the problems posed given the count structure of our dependent variable. The
Negative Binomial distribution is a generalization of the Poisson distribution, allowing a less restrictive mean-variance relationship (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . As in our case, if data is not equidispersed 12 , Negative Binomial Regression is more suitable because the ratio between the mean and variance of the dependent variable is also a parameter to be estimated. However, the estimation algorithm of Negative Binomial models is less stable and efficient than other GLM algorithms, such as the Logit models (MacCullagh and Nelder, 1989) ). As we show in Basic Results, most results from Logit, Negative Binomial and OLS models with fixed-effects are similar.
A.1. Instrumental Variables and Identification Strategy
Reverse causality is not a severe problem in our study. As far we know, there is no theory suggesting that coalition participation has an effect on country's real GDPs or on any other main independent variable (political regime and openness to trade). Substantively it is also not intuitive how participating in a small part of the GATT/WTO activities exert an impact on a country's GDP, political regime, openness to trade or any other independent 11 With GAM, we easily interpret our models graphically in a cross-section setting. 12 We conducted a test proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) The instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term. Otherwise, it will suffer from the same problems that we are trying to fix (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Kennedy, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010 Wooldridge, , 2012 .
We lagged in seven years the number of natural disasters at country-level and used it as an instrumental variable for GDP. Lags decrease the probability of correlation between the error terms of our 2SLS regression (Murray, 2006) , which is already unlikely since our instrument is "as if random." In other words, "natural disasters" happen by chance and in an haphazard way (Sovey and Green, 2011) . 14 There are also not any theory that relates the number natural disasters with any form of participation in international coalitions. As the number of natural disasters do not directly influence whether a country enters into trade coalitions or not, the hypothesis of exclusion restriction is sounding. Countries that had 13 Previously we adopted a strategy similar to Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) , who use data on luminosity to correct measurement errors in poor countries' GDPs. We found a strong correlation between countries' total number of phone lines and countries' GDPs. When we include phone-lines as an instrument, the results are similar to OLS regressions.
14 Several papers have used natural occurring phenomenon as instruments for political and economic variables (Sovey and Green, 2011) . The notorious work of Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) , for example, use rainfall as an instrument of per capita economic growth to estimate its impact on civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
and Obersteiner, 2008) . 15 In sum, any effect of past natural disasters on coalition entry is expected to happen through GDP.
A.2. Mediation Analysis and Causal Mechanisms
Mediation analysis examine causal mechanisms that underlies a relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable through the inclusion of a third mediation variable. Rather than suppose a direct causal relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable, a causal mediation model shows that the independent variable influences a dependent variable indirectly through a mediator. The indirect effect represents the expected causal mechanism and the direct effect represents all the other mechanisms.
The total effect is the sum of the average causal effect and the direct causal effect (Imai et al., 2011) .
We argue that countries with higher aggregated economic power have a higher likelihood of joining bargaining coalitions in the GATT/WTO. Our causal mechanism is based on the idea of "transaction costs." Large economies can pay for the uncertain and uneven results of the GATT/WTO negotiations, since they have enough resources to gather information on trade, to hire law firms and skillful diplomats and negotiators.
The idea of transaction costs is difficult to measure accurately. Following Sattler and Bernauer (2011), Bown (2005) and Guzman and Simmons (2005) , we use the number of delegates in Geneva as a proxy of bureaucratic capacity of countries bargaining at the GATT/WTO. As the number of delegates only captures some of transaction costs involved in negotiating together in the GATT/WTO, we are probably measuring our mediator with errors and underestimating its true indirect effect. For example, many delegates work both at the GATT/WTO and at other international institutions-notably the United Nations.
Some countries might have fewer delegates in Geneva, but hire more independent negotiators, and law and consulting firms. At last, number does not mean quality-a higher number of delegates do not translate directly into a more efficient gathering of information and negotiating skills (Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009) . Despite potential problems of using the number of delegates in Geneva as a proxy for transactional costs, it is unlikely that it systematically underrepresents other types of transaction costs. Probably, it happens in the other way around. Countries that can pay for a large diplomatic mission in Geneva are also more able to pay for other types of transaction costs. As we said in the Data and Variables section, the WTO only provides the number of delegates in Geneva from 1994 to 2004-a shorter time horizon than the period of our research, which weakens our statistical results.
There is a dense debate in the statistical literature on mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982) . In all mediation methods the researcher must make strong assumptions, especially when using observational data. Nonetheless, investigating causal mechanisms is too important to be left out. The statistical debate on different mediation analysis methods is beyond the scope of this work. Here, we employ the method proposed by Imai et al. (2011) , which involves two stages. We first use a linear multilevel regression to estimate the effect of log of GDP on the number of delegates. 16 Second, we use a Logit multinomial regression to estimate the effect of log of GDP on coalition entry, controlling for democracy, trade openness and North-South hemispheres. In the first equation we assume that the number of delegates is random if countries have similar GDPs. In the second equation we assume that countries join coalitions randomly if they have similar GDPs.
The mediation analysis relies on the assumption that there is no unmeasured mediator influencing both coalition entry and the number of delegates in Geneva. In the Basic Results section, we further detail our findings.
B. Cross-Section Analysis

B.1. Generalized Additive Models (GAMs)
In this paper, not only we want to verify a relationship between coalition entry and our independent variables, but also to visualize its functional form. One advantage of Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) is to display non-linear marginal effects graphically.
Unlike linear models that assume a global linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, GAM allows the relationship varies locally over the range of the dependent and independent variables (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990; Beck and Jackman, 1998) . We estimate GAM using a Bernoulli distribution with a Logit link function. The GAM models establish a smoothing function of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, given the control variables. Below, we formally present our main non-linear model: 16 Gelman (2007) is the best reference we know on multilevel models for political scientists.
log(
where π i is the probability that the dependent variable "coalition entry" at individual country i is 1 rather than 0; α is a constant; p is the number of independent variables; ε i is the error term which is independent of the X j , var(ε) = s 2 , E(ε) = 0 and i = 1,..., N .
f j (X j ) is a smooth function. f j replaces the linear function βX it that we see in our linear model (see Equation 1 ).
GAM is a semi-parametric model and is more general than the GLM. It is parametric when we assume a distribution for the dependent variable, modeling its average. It is nonparametric when the average is modeled through smoothing functions, which are functions that estimate the functional form of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. As we can include linear and categorical variables in GAM, below we extend the Equation 2: log(
where q is the number of non-smoothed terms to be included. The most simple smooth function is a moving average. It averages neighborhoods of points around the target value to produce an estimate. More sophisticated functions employ weighting to points as they move away from the target value. Loess, for instance, uses locally linear fits and is explicitly local in nature, the degree of locality depending on the span of data points used.
Here, we use cubic smoothing splines, but loess provides similar results. Regression splines "offer a compromise by representing the fit as a piecewise polynomial" (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990, p. 22) . Polynomials are added together by knots, and the polynomial curves between regions join smoothly at each region break point. Cubic smoothing splines reduce the compromise between goodness-of-fit and degree of smoothness. If the number of degrees of freedom is low, the spline is smooth. If it is high, a less smooth spline are generated. Unlike Beck and Jackman (1998, p. 610), we have not constrained our smoothing parameters, relying on the mgcv package from R to automatically choose smoothing parameters so as to minimize prediction errors. We have already presented other linear, binary and count dependent variable models, so that here we truly want to "get the mean right."
With automatically chosen smoothing parameters, finding that our main variable-real GDP-has an almost global linear relationship with coalition entry makes our results less controversial (or manipulative) from the statistical point of view. Finally, we use a Logit transformation function to visualize the relationship between our dependent and independent variables in a probability form. The use of probabilities facilitates the interpretation of our results.
VI. Basic Results
A. Panel Data Econometrics
The log of real GDP increases the likelihood of a country joining a coalition at the GATT/WTO across the two different ways we measure our dependent variable. Table 3 presents linear models in which "coalition entry" includes both all coalitions that participate in the GATT/WTO (Panel A) and the ones that have only been created for negotiating at the GATT/WTO (Panel B). F-statistics corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the excluded instrument equals 0. Seven years lag of natural disasters is a strong instrument as F-statistics varies from 24.85 to 12.65. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest F ≥ 10. The Hausman test of endogeneity compares the OLS and the 2SLS panel data estimators. We rejected the null hypothesis that both estimators are consistent, so that the 2SLS regression is more appropriated. All specifications include country fixed effects and bootstrap standard errors with 400 resamples.
Columns 1 through 3 present model specifications that estimate the impact of real GDP on coalition entry. In column 1 (Panel A) we regress the seven-years lagged number of natural disasters on the potential endogenous variable real GDP (First Stage of the 2SLS regression). Column 2 (Panel A) shows the effects of real GDP on coalition entry without the use of an instrument. The probability of a country joining a coalition increases by 63% when real GDP increases by one standard deviation. After being instrumented, the effect of 1 standard deviation increase in GDP boosts the probability of a country joining a coalition by 142%. The Hausman test (476.00; P rob > χ 2 = 0) suggests that both the OLS and the 2SLS models are dissimilar. Then, when we are not including an instrumental variable we are being conservative about the true effect of the real GDP on coalition entry.
In column 2 (Panel B) we find that one standard deviation increase in GDP increases the probability of a country joining a coalition by 61%. When we use the instrument (column 3), 1 standard deviation increase of GDP boosts the probability of a country joining a coalition by 139%.
In columns 4 through 6 we run models specifications that estimate the impact of GDP Results are stable across all our model specifications: all are statistically significant, most of them at 99% confidence interval. The effect size of GDP and trade openness are large. As expected, Panel B present weak results because we have less observations when we exclude coalitions that negotiate at the GATT/WTO but were not create with this goal. Table 4 repeats the specifications shown in Table 3 with both measures of coalition entry-"coaltrade" in Panel A and "coalwto" in Panel B. In both panels we use Logit and Negative Binomial models. Since our instrument provides even stronger results than the ones from other models, we choose not to include instrumental variables in more complex models. Therefore, we can be more conservative in our estimations and to make inferences for all set of countries independent of their numbers of natural disasters. One disadvantages of instrumental variables is that they only estimates local average treatment effects (LATE) (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) . In our case, we estimate that countries that have an increase in their GDPs because of previous cases of natural disasters join coalitions more often. The results from Table 4 In sum, our results show that GDP is the most important variable in our study. It presents a large size effect and it normally reaches statistical significance at 0.1% level.
Trade openness is also an important predictor of coalition entry. In general, however, its size effects are smaller than the real GDP and it is less often statistical significant. Finally, both measures of democracy are weak predictors of a country joining a coalition. They are rarely statistical significant and their effect sizes are small. Nevertheless, the positive sign of the democracy coefficients is consistent with our theoretical expectations.
B. Mediation Analysis
The mediation analysis conducted here is divided into two steps. We use linear multilevel regression to estimate the effect of log of GDP on the number of delegates in Geneva.
Second, we use a Logit multinomial regression to estimate the effect of log of GDP on coalition entry, controlling for democracy, trade openness and North-South hemispheres.
In the two models we created one intercept for each year from 1994 to 2004. We use a time-horizon shorter than the one used in the remaining of the paper because there is no data available on the number of delegates for a longer period. In the first equation, we assume that the number of delegates is random if countries have similar real GDPs, controlling for our covariates. In the second, we assume that the number of times countries join a coalition is random if they have the same real GDP, also controlling for the same covariates. The last assumption-called sequential ignorability-states that there is no observed or unobserved (mediation) covariates that affects both coalition entry 20 ("coaltrade" and "coalwto") and the number of delegates in Geneva. We use the mediation package from R to estimate our models. We use bootstrap standard errors with 1,000
resamples in all models.
When the outcome model is a GLM model, such as our Logit multinomial regression, the ACME and direct effect (ADE) estimates will differ between the treatment and control conditions (Tingley et al., 2014, p. 8) . Because point estimates of the control and treatment groups largely overlap for both ACME and ADE, we only interpret the averages of ACME and ADE. If we add up ACME to ADE, we obtain the Total Effect-see Figures 2f, 3f , 4f and 5f. Dots represent point estimates. Horizontal lines depict 95% confidence intervals-with a vertical line at zero to facilitate interpretation.
We have four different model specifications. In Figure 2 , the dependent variablecoalition entry-includes all countries that participates in coalition at the GATT/WTO
(coaltrade) and we use a dichotomous measure of democracy as a control variable. In Figure   3 , the dependent variable only includes countries that participate in the GATT/WTO (coalwto) and we use the same measure of democracy. In Figure 4 , we use the dependent variable "coaltrade" and a continuous measure of democracy (Polity IV). Finally, in Figure   5 we use the dependent variable "coalwto" and also a continuous measure of democracy.
Our first mediation model at Figure 2 has 1451 observations. The probability of the ACME is 1.33%-statistical significant at zero [95% CI: 0.00384, 0.02466]. The direct effect (ADE) of log of real GDP decreases the probability that a country joins a coalition by −2.2%-also significant at zero [95% CI: -0.03583, -0.00745]. Total effect decreases the probability by −0.84% [p-value: 0.1; CI: -0.01651, 0.00128]. Our proposed mechanism (ACME) correspond to a −141.6% change of the total effect-[p-value: 0.1; CI: -10.97412, 13.56305]. In Figure 3 , we also have 1451 observations. ACME has a probability of 0.7%
[p-value: 0.05; 95% CI: 1.75e-05, 1.74e-02], whereas the decreasing probability of ADE is Having an intercept for each year from 1994 to 2004 does not meaningfully alter our results. As expected, the uncertainty of our estimates-measured by confidence intervalsare even larger when yearly sub-setting the data (see Figures 2b, 2c, 3b, 3c, 4b, 4c, 5b, 5c; Figures 2d, 2e, 3d, 3e, 4d, 4e, 5d, 5e; and Figures 2f, 3f, 4f; and 5f ). Nevertheless, the direction of our coefficients, showing that our results are consistent throughout the years.
In sum, the effect of log of GDP on coalition entry mediated by its number of delegates in Geneva (ACME) presents a probability that goes from 1.5% to 0.7%-always highly statistical significant. The average direct effect of log of GDP on coalition entry goes from −2.2% to −0.5%-presenting more uncertainty in its estimates. The results suggest that the effects of real GDP on coalition entry is mediated by the number of delegates in Geneva. Since the ACME is always positive and the ADE is negative, the total effect is close to zero, but our expected mechanism is responsible for around 100% change of the total effect. Our small, but statistical significant average mediation causal effects (ACME) pale in comparison with other results presented by us. We should evaluate them cautiously, though. Because of a small sample size, some of our inferences are uncertain. Moreover, as we argue in the Mediation Analysis and Causal Mechanisms, the number of delegates in Geneva is only a proxy of some "transaction costs" a country pays when negotiating collectively at the WTO. Our results are robust to other model-based mediation analysis and other model specifications not shown in this paper. 17 Also not shown in this paper, both real GDP and the number of delegates have a significant effect on coalition entry when using panel fixed-effects models. Nonetheless, the effect of both variables decrease when they are put together in the equation. all other variables constant, the higher the real GDP, the more likely a country will join a coalition. The shape of our smoothing functions is robust to different model specifications. Furthermore, the relationship is close to linear, which suggests that a global linear function-instead of a smoothing function-is the most appropriated method. Assuming linearity is theoretically more parsimonious. The assumption of linearity works quite well for our the relationship between real GDP and coalition entry in the two ways we measure our dependent variable. The probability of the lowest real GDP countries in our data set to join a trade coalition is 20%. Middle income countries (or middle powers) present a probability of less than 60%. The wealthiest countries join coalitions with more than 80%
probability. In sum, richest countries in aggregated terms are the ones that have participated more in coalitions within the GATT/WTO system. Middle-and especially smaller powers-are being left behind. is dropped from the sample, the effect of the log of trade openness becomes almost linear.
Our shaded confidence intervals also becomes larger after the 2.5 threshold.
In Figure 6c -controlling for our other independent variables-the effect of Polity IV index is clearly not linear. It presents an almost inverted U-shaped curve such as Figure   6b . Apparently, there is a threshold value close to −5. At countries with low levels of democracy, more democracy means more cooperation. The effect is positive and locally linear for countries with lower levels of democracy. As for countries above the threshold, the effect of more democracy is virtually nonexistent. Actually, there is a slightly downward trend for highly democratic countries.
Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c present GAM estimates for our measure of coalition entry that considers only coalitions that were built inside and for the GATT/WTO negotiations (coalwto). The results only change slightly. The effects of real GDP is still almost (globally) linear (Figure 7a ). At the lower bound of the distribution, the probability of a country joining a coalition is 20%. At the upper bound the probability is over than 80%. Trade openness also presents an almost inverted U-shaped curve (Figure 7b ). The probability of a closed economy to join a coalition is around 40%. Finally, again, Polity IV presents a local linear effect on coalition entry for dictatorships open their political regimes-the probability of joining a coalition goes from 20% to 60% between −10 and −5 in the Polity IV score. After that, there is an incremental downward trend. In the end of the distribution, the trend slowly accelerates-see Figure 7c . There is a curvilinear threshold at around −5 level of democracy in the upper bound of the distribution. After the 5.5 threshold, there is a strong downward trend, where lies the countries with higher levels of democracy. The results suggest that only dictatorships that increasingly become more democratic cooperate more in the GATT/WTO system.
VII. Conclusion
We found strong and robust evidences that larger economies tend to join coalitions more often than smaller ones. There is a linear and strong relationship between countries' higher real GDP and coalition participation within the GATT/WTO system. The magnitude of the size effects is around 60%. We have obtained similar results with different statistical methods, several model specifications and two different ways of measuring our dependent variable. In addition, when we use non-linear regressions, the relationship between GDP and coalition entry is kept almost linear.
Our main finding, then, challenges the "weapons of the weak" argument (Drahos, 2003; Braithwaite, 2004) . Coalitions are not one of the few weapons in the hands of weaker countries. They are another tool that is already more employed by strong economieseither from the developing or from the developed world. Since the relationship between real GDP and coalition entry is linear, middle economic powers also do not present a distinctive collectivist behavior if we compare them to large economies (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993; Higgott and Cooper, 1990) .
Countries more open to trade also participate in coalitions often in contrast with closed economies because the GATT/WTO is an institution that stimulate free-trade between nations. More unexpected is finding few evidences that democracies cooperate more than undemocratic countries across two different measures of democracy and several statistical methods and model specifications. Granted, we only selected countries that are members of the GATT/WTO and we cannot generalize our findings on political regime to other domains. As a caveat, the positive sign of the panel regression coefficients and a local linearity in GAM models do not discard the "democratic peace" literature all together (Edward, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002a; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . What the nonlinear findings show is that the "democratic peace theory" is more complex than linear (or GLM) models assume. Actually, Beck and Jackman (1998) proposed non-linear models to refine the "democratic peace theory" in one of the first and few articles in political science to employ the GAM methodology. 19
The "transaction costs" literature (Coase, 1960; North, 1990; Williamson, 1979) help us to make sense of our main finding. Bigger economies tend to participate more in coalitions because they have enough resources to pay for the high "transaction costs" of collectively participate in complex and long negotiations. Among other costs, countries have to keep diplomatic missions in Geneva. Mediation analysis suggests that our causal mechanism is plausible. Bargaining in the GATT/WTO is also a risky business. As coalitions are groups competing in negotiations with other countries and coalitions (Esteban, 2001) , victory is not guaranteed. Economic gains from participating in the GATT/WTO is also debatable (Rose, 2004; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007) and probably uneven in favor of rich-developed countries (Subramanian and Wei, 2007) , discouraging weaker economies to collectively bargaining in the GATT/WTO negotiations. We, finally, urge researchers to further test our causal mechanism with other research designs and methods. Other measures of coalition entry for other institutions have also to be devised to confirm the generalization of our findings as well as their limits.
19 GAM is already a consolidated methodology in statistics. The foundational text on GAM (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990) has had over than 9,740 cites on Google Scholar until January, 2014. Effects of the log of real GDP (6a), of the log of trade openness (6b) and of the Polity IV (6c) on coalition entry (coaltrade). Vertical axes (y) display the values of coalition entry. Y-axes scales were transformed by a Logit link function to represent probability intervals. Each graph shows the estimated value of the degrees of freedom for each smoothing function. A 95% confidence interval for the cubic smoothing splines is shaded. Effects of the log of real GDP (7a), of the log of trade openness (7b) and of the Polity IV (7c) on coalition entry (coaltrade). Vertical axes (y) display the values of coalition entry. Y-axes scales ere transformed by a Logit link function to represent probability intervals. Each graph shows the estimated value of the degrees of freedom for each smoothing function. A 95% confidence interval for the cubic smoothing splines is shaded.
